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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
C. A. DAVIS, dba C. A. Davis Company a.nd CHARLES MONT MAHONEY, S-TANFORD MAH.ONEY
and J. J. MAHONEY, dba Red Cedar
:Niill Company, a co-partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 8148
-vs.LAVELL KEMP, and B R Y C E
CHENEY, dba Lost River Saw Mill
Co., a co-partnership,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

S.TATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and respondents agree with defendant and
appellant's statement of facts down to the middle of page
3 of appellant's brief. From that point on we disagree.
Continuing from said point the facts are as follows:
The written agreement (Exhibit 8) between Kemp
and Blackburn contained the entire agreement between
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them with respect to the sale of the sawmill and equipment. There were no side or verbal agree1nents respecting the sale. (R. 99, 100) An examination of Exhibit
8 shows that Blackburn did not assume the obligation
that is the subject of this lawsuit at the time the sale
was made. Such an assun1ption occurred, if at all, a year
later in April 1952 at a meeting held in Kemp's home in
Salt Lake City, when Kemp invited Blackburn, Davis and
Charles M. Mahoney to his hon1e to discuss the obligation
and the matter of payment.
Blackburn owed Kemp money on the purchase price
of the sawmill and defendant, Ke1np, owed plaintiffs the
obligation in question (R. 49, 50). At the said April1952
meeting Blackburn, at Ke1np's request, agreed to pay
part of the money he owed to Ken1p by delivering 17,000
feet of lumber to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in turn agreed that
if and when Blackburn did deliver the lumber they would
release ICen1p from the obligation he owed them. (R. 47
to 52, 72, 117)
Plain tiffs did not release or agree to release Kemp
from the obligation (R. 72, 73, 78, 96, 97, 101). Blackburn was supposed to make delivery of the lumber in two
loads of 8500 feet each. The first load was to be delivered
in May 1952 and the second load in June 1952. Davis
called Blackburn and asked him why the lumber had not
been delivered. Blackburn told him his planer had broken
down and that whatever lu1nber he was able to plane he
felt he should sell for ready cash. He then said he could
deliver the lumber in another month (R. 79). Plaintiffs

2
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went along with the delay because there was nothing
else they could do (R .. 74, 77).
Defendant is appealing only from the money judgment entered by the court and is not appealing from the
judgment of no cause of action on defendant's counterclaim (defendant's brief pages 2 and 4). The evidence
pertaining to the taking of the tractor by plaintiffs is
material only on the counterclaim of defendant. We disagree with defendant's statement of facts regarding
the taking of the tractor, however, since the counterclaim
is not involved in this appeal, we will not state our version
of the facts on that point.
We have restricted our stateinent of facts to those
that are material to the narrow issues raised by defendant in his brief.
POINTS ARGUED BY RESPONDENT
I. Defendant, Lavell Kemp, was not discharged
from liability on the obligation in question.
A. Plaintiffs did not agree to discharge defendant from the obligation.
B.

Blackburn did not assume the obligation.

C. Assuming, for purpose of argument, that
Blackburn did assume the obligation, plaintiff's did
not consent to a material alteration in the nature or
time of payment of such obligation.
1.

For extension agreement to discharge

3
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retiring partner, (Ke1np) it 1nust be a binding
contract.
2. No consideration for claimed extension
agreement.
3. There was no change in the nature of
the obligation.
4. Kemp consented to the purported and
claimed extension granted to Blackburn.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
DEFENDANT, LAVELL KEMP, WAS NOT DISCHARGED
FROM LIABILITY ON THE OBLIGATION IN QUESTION.

Subsections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 48-1-33, U.C.A.,
1953, provides :
"1. The dissolution of a partnership does not
of itself discharge the existing liability of any
partner.
2. A partner is discharged for any existing
liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an
agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or partnership
continuing the business; and such agreen1ent may
be inferred from the course of dealing between the
creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and
the p·erson or partnership continuing the business.
3. Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, the
partners whose obligations have been assumed
shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agree4
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ment, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations."
Under subsection (1) of this statute it is obvious that
Kemp remained liable on the debt to plaintiffs after dissolution of the Kemp-Cheney partnership.
A. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT AGREE TO DISCHARGE
DEFENDANT FROM THE OBLIGATION.

Subsection (2) of the statute has no application to the
case at bar because plaintiffs did not agree to release or
discharge Kemp from the obligation (R. 72, 73, 78, 96,
97, 101).
Ke1np, on cross examination, admitted that when his
deposition 'vas taken he testified that he did not remember Davis or Mahoney saying anything that indicated
they were going to release Kemp from his obligation (R.
96, 97, 101). The trial court found that plaintiffs did not
agree at any tin1e to release Kemp from the debt (R.117).
B.

BLACKBURN DID NOT ASSUME THE DEBT.

The trial court found that Blackburn did not assume
or agree to assu1ne the obligation owed by Kemp to plaintiffs (R. 117).
Exhibit 8 constituted the entire agreement between
Blackburn and Ken1p at the time of the sale of the sawmill and equipment (R. 99, 100). An examination of that
exhibit shows Blackburn did not assume the obligation
in question at the time of said sale.
The only other t'ime Blackburn could have assumed
the obligation was at the meeting in Kemp's home during
the month of April1952. All of the evidence pertaining to

5
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that meeting is contained on pages 45 to 52, 60, 61, 69
to 80, 84 to 87, 96, 97, 101 of the record.
The evidence shows that Blackburn owed Ke1np a
substantial amount of money on the purchase price of the
sawmill and that Kemp owed plaintiffs the money in
question. Plaintiffs had been after Kemp to pay the debt
(R. 84). Kemp wanted to collect his own money from
Blackburn, so Kemp, in order to collect part of the money
due him, asked Blackburn to pay plaintiff's what Kemp
owed them with lumber. This was nothing more than an
arrangement of convenience whereby plaintiffs would accept the lumber if Blackburn delivered it and if he did
deliver it then part of Blackburn's debt to Kemp would be
paid and Kemp's debt to plaintiffs would be paid (R. 45,
46, 47, 73). Plain tiffs never considered that they had
any legal rights as against Blackburn, but they always
felt their rights were against Kemp only (R. 60).
The arrangement for delivery of the lun1ber by
Blackburn to the plaintiffs is very similar to the situa-·
tion where the wage earner arranges with his boss to pay
so much out of his wages to the creditor. The creditor
is happy to accept the payments from the boss and to that
extent discharge the wage earner, but if the boss doesn't
pay, certainly the creditor could not clain1 the boss had
assumed the obligation.
We submit that the evidence amply sustains the
finding of the trial court that Blackburn did not assu1ne
the obligation in question.
Under subsection (3) of the quoted statute one of the

6
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elements essential to the discharge of Ke1np is that someone assume the obligation in question. Absent such an
assumption there can be no discharge of Kemp.
C. ASSUMING FOR PURPOSE OF ARGUMENT, THAT
BLACKBURN DID ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF KEMP,
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT CONSENT TO A MATERIAL ALTERATION IN THE NATURE OR TIME OF PAYMENT OF
SUCH OBLIGATION.

It is generally held that an agreement between the
withdrawing partner (Kemp) and the continuing partner
or purchaser of the business (Blackburn) whereby the
latter assumes the payment of the firm debts operates
to render the retiring partner (Kemp) liable merely as
a surety for their payment. 68 C.J'.S., Section 264, p.
755. Nelson v. Century Indemnity Co., 65 F. (2) 765
Ninth Cir. Preston v. Garrard, 120 Ga. 689, 48 S.E. 118.
Subsection (3) of the statute quoted above fixes the relationship between the retiring partner and the purchaser
continuing the business or the person assuming the obligation as that of principal and surety and the creditor is
required to recognize that relationship.
FOR EXTENSION AGREEMENT TO DISCHARGE
RETIRING PARTNER, (KEMP), IT MUST BE A BINDING
CONTRACT.
1.

Assuming for purposes of argument that Blackburn
in fact assu1ned the obligation in question, did the conduct
of plaintiffs an1ount to such an extension of time of paytnent as to discharge Kemp from the debt~ 72 C.J.S.. Section 174, p. 652 states the general rule as follows: "There
must be a binding enforceable contract extending the

7
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time of payment to the principal debtor in order to effect a release of the surety."
The case of Lenger v. Hulst, 259 Mich. 640, 244 N.W.
187, cited by ap·pellant recognizes and states the general
rule that the extension must be a binding enforceable
contract which prevents the creditor fron1 enforcing payment from the p·rincipal during the extended time. The
Michigan Court said, "but he was released, when, without
his_ consent or acquiescence, in any way, plaintiffs by
renewal of each of these notes extended the time within
which the obligations were payable and could be enforced
* * * u~til plaintiff voluntarily extended the time within
~which each of these notes were payable, payment could
have been enforcd agailnst defendarn.t." (Italics ours.) In
this case the notes in question had been renewed several
times for ninety day periods. The renewals were binding
extension agreements. The decision on its facts is certain-~y r~ght but is n?.t authority for the propositions defendant cites it for.
2. NO CONSIDERATION FOR CLAIMED EXTENSION
AGREEMENT.

72 C.J.S., Section 182, p. 656 states: "that an agreement for an extension of time n1ust be supported by a
sufficient consideration in order to effect the discharge
of the surety." Brill v. Hoile, 11 N.W. 42, 53 Wis. 531
holds in --effect that if the party relies on an agreement
for an extension of time there must be a valid consideration for such extension before it will op·erate to discharge
the retiring partner from the obligation. To the same
8
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effect see Associate Discou;nt Corp. v. Greisinger, et al.,
103 F. Supp. 705. Barlow v. Frederick Stearns Co., 98
S.W. 455, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 321.
Mere delay, indulgence or forbearance to the principal will not discharge the surety. 72 C.J.S., Sec. 174, p.
652. The court in Michelin Tire Co. v. Akens, 255 Pac.
388, 32 N.~f. 234, said:
"Mere delay or forbearance in enforcing collection by creditor against a partner assuming the
debt (principal) does not effect the retiring partner (surety's) release. An extension of time will
do it. But mere forbearance will not. It is settled
as a general rule that the mere passive delay of the
creditor in proceeding against the principal, however long continued and however injurious it may
be to the surety will not discharge the surety. In
such case the contract is not changed and the
surety may at any tin1e pay the debt and proceed
against the principal."
The court goes on to say,
"While a surety may be discharged by an
agreement between the creditor and the principal
debtor for an extension of the time of payment,
the essential elements of a contract must be present; not only must the agreement be upon a sufficient consideration, but the time of payment must
be definitely fixed; otherwise the surety will not
be discharged."

40 Am. ,Jur., Sec. 215, p. 280 cites the Michelin Case
and says:
"But mere forbearance of the creditor to press
collection does not, it has been held, release the
9
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retiring partner's liability even though he rnay be
regarded as having the status merely of a surety,
and even though in the meantime the situation rnay
have so changed that the retiring partner cannot
enforce indemnity against the continuing partner."
In Barlow v. Fredrick Stearns & Co., supra, the
court said,
"Plaintiff was never, by any agreement shown
in the record, placed in a position in which the
right to enforce the payment of the account was
deferred, and the delay in bringing the suit was
due to mere forbearance on its part, and not because of any binding agreement which prevented
such suit. Unless the agreement to extend is of
such binding force as to prevent suit upon the
claim during the time covered by the alleged extension, it is not such an agreement with a principal debtor as will release the surety."

Advance Rubber Co. v. Bershad, 211 N.Y.S. 574,
holds that:
1. F·ailure to sue is not a material alteration in nature or time of payment within Partnership Law Sec.
67, releasing partner whose obligations have been assumed on dissolution of partnership from liability to
creditor of partnership·, "\Vho, knowing of the agreement,
consents to material alteration in nature or time of payment of such obligations.
2. Mere indulgence by creditor of principal debtor
will not discharge the surety.
Ap·plying the doctrine of the cases and texts cited
above to the case before this court, it is obvious that there
was no agreement between plaintiffs and Blackburn to

10
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extend the time for delivery of the lumber. The record
can be searched through and no evidence of a consideration for such an extension agreement can he found.
The trial court found that plaintiffs did not extend
the time of payment for Blackburn (R. 117, 118). Blackburn was supposed to deliver one load of lumber in May
1952 and one in June of that year (R. 76, 77). When it
was not delivered Davis called Blackburn on the phone
and asked why it hadn't been delivered. Blackburn replied that his planer was broken down and that whatever
lumber he was able to plane he felt he should sell it for
ready cash. He then said he could deliver the lumber
in another month (R. 79). Plaintiffs went along with the
delay because there vvas nothing else they could do about
it (R. 74, 77).
It should he noted that Blackburn did not call plaintiffs and ask for more time, nor did he promise to do anything more than he had already stated he would do, in
return for plaintiffs granting him more time. Instead
Davis had to call Blackburn and Blackburn said he
would deliver the lumber next month. Plaintiffs didn't
agree that that was alright, they merely delayed or forbore doing anything (assuming Blackburn had assumed
the obligation and plaintiffs had a right against him)
about enforcing the obligation.
We subinit that under the doctrine of the cases cited
above there was no extension by plaintiffs of the time
for payment. "l_1here was no consideration for such an
extension agreen1ent. The most plaintiffs' conduct vvould

11
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amount to was a delay, indulgence or forbearance to
Blackburn and therefore Kemp is not discharged.
3. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF
THE OBLIGATION.

Defendant claims that there was a change in the nature of the obligation in that, when the loan was originally made to Kemp, the terms of payn1ent were different
than the terms of payment claimed to have been made
with Blackburn at the April1952 meeting.
In the first place Blackburn did not assume the obligation in question, and hence the relation of principal and
surety did not exist between Kemp and Blackburn (R.
117). Kemp always remained primarily liable to plaintiffs. Secondly if we assume for purpose of argument
only, that Blackburn did assume the obligation and Kemp
was placed in the p-osition of a surety, the law is clear
that a surety is not discharged by an extension of the
time of payment or performance or a change in the nature
of payment to which he consents. 72 C.J.S. S.ections 158
and 191, pages 644 and 660, Lenger v. Hulst, supra, Preston v. Garrard, supra.
Kemp was the one responsible for getting all the parties together in Ap·ril 1952 for the meeting at Kemps
home (R. 84, 85). Kemp knew of the purported arrangement for Blackburn to deliver lumber to plaintiffs and he
knew the terms thereof. Having procured and consented
to such arrangement, Kemp cannot now claim it was a
material alteration in the nature of payment which discharges him from the debt.
12
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4. KEMP CONSENTED TO THE PURPORTED AND
CLAIMED EXTENSION GRANTED TO BLACKBURN.

All of the evidence in the record shows that Kemp
had knowledge of and consented to Blackburn's delay in
delivering the lumber to plaintiffs (R. 51, 52, 59, 60, 79,
80). Kemp did not deny the testimony of Mahoney &
Davis. Their testimony shows affirmatively that Kemp
had knowledge of and consented to Blackburn's delay in
delivering the lumber to plaintiffs. Since all of the evidence in the record, together 'vith Kemp's failure to deny
the same, shows that he did consent to such delay, he cannot now claim that he was discharged from the obligation in question. 72 C.J.S. Sections 158 and 191, pages
644 and 660, Lenger v. HruJst, supra, Preston v. Garrard,
supra.
SUM11ARY
In summary we submit that Lavell Kemp was not
discharged from the obligation for the following reasons:
1.

There was no assu1nption of the debt by Blackburn. The arrangement between Blackburn and
·plaintiffs and Kemp was merely one of convenience.

2.

Assuming that Blackburn did assu1ne the debt
there was still no discharge because,
a. There was no agreen1ent between plaintiffs
and Blackburn for the claimed extension.
b. If there 'vas an agreement for an extension
there was no consideration therefor, hence
the agreement was not enforceable and

13
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c.

d.

would not result in ·a discharge of Kemp.
If there was an enforceable extension agreement, Kemp had knowledge thereof and consented thereto and hence could not claim a
discharge.
Plaintiffs conduct, with relation to the
claimed extension of time for payment was
nothing more than mere delay, indulgence
or forbearance and therefore would not result in a discharge of the debt.
Resp.ectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HANNI,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
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